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KEANE & LIN: Patriotism is not enough ...

COMMENTARY

Patriotism Is Not Enough:
Chinese Intellectuals
And The Knowledge Economy
This paper examines the changing appeal of patriotism and nationalism
in the civic consciousness of Chinese intellectuals shaped by the notion
of a global knowledge economy. It investigates the career aspirations of
scientists and IT professionals returning from overseas study in the US
and argues that the famous motto of intellectuals during the 1980s –
“Science does not have national boundaries but I (the scientist) have the
nationality”, is losing its appeal. Scientists and IT professionals are
acknowledged as knowledge-workers and are valued in nation building.
At the same time they have the freedom to not return home by virtue of
a global demand for their services and attractive skilled-migrant schemes
in a number of western countries. In examining recent policy changes
by the Chinese government to recruit scholars of Chinese origin studying
and working overseas, the paper discusses the Chinese government’s
response to the “brain drain” and how it has sought measures to ensure
growth in its national knowledge capital.
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hina’s socialist leadership has long embraced a fascination
with science and technology. Newspeak from the Politburo
proclaims the future of information technology. Political
propaganda and market hype come together to promote the
benefits of the new technological revolution. A journey from
Beijing’s Capital airport to the city centre leaves visitors in no
doubt that the “e-age” (e-shidai), if not immediately evident in
the throng of traffic and traders, is an auspicious omen. The
technological revolution promises a broadband cable backbone
dispensing the fruits of the knowledge economy to a nation
emerging from dependence on heavy industry and agriculture.
Techno-utopia displaces the dawn of communism in futures
analysis. People will be liberated from the drudgery of menial
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 11, July - December 2001

KEANE & LIN: Patriotism is not enough ...

labour and they will be re-educated and learn to love the Net.
They will have almost unlimited choice of multi-channel television
programming but no choice in deciding who is the government.
It is well documented that the upgrading of technological
infrastructure is linked to national “informatization” plans and
China’s eventual integration into the global economy post-WTO
accession (Keller 2000; Ure and Liang 2000; APEC 2001; Lovelock
1999; Liu 1997; Li 1995; Tan 1995). The technological upgrading is
founded on emergence of knowledge as the structural basis of
power, a scenario in which its privatisation contributes to national
competitiveness and integration within the global economy.
Foreign direct investment (FDI), along with technology
transfer, is a key ingredient in China’s informatization projects. In
particular, the task of enabling technology transfer has become
central to the relationship between the Chinese government and
its intellectuals. During the 1980s – the early years of the reforms
in China – it was widely believed that obsolescent technology was
a prime reason why China lagged behind the West (Wall and Yin
1997: 169). China looked to the success of the newly industrialized
countries (NICs) such as Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, who had
drawn on the Japanese development model of government
intervention and the copying of technology development in
government-sponsored incubators (see Matthews 1999). It was
established that China started from a lower base: it needed to invest
substantially in its education and training of highly skilled
personnel. Of the so-called four modernizations (agriculture,
national defence, industry, science and technology), science and
technology has most concerned the national leadership. In order
to leapfrog into the information age, a number of technology
enhancement programmes and policies were put in place.
China is well on the way to constructing its own National
Information Infrastructure (NII) with a view to being a global
player in IT and knowledge-based industries (KBI). China’s IT
industry is ranked the fourth largest in the world according to the
Ministry of Information Industry (Qu 2000). However, the size of
this sector is perhaps misleading and these claims need to be taken
in context. Most of China’s increased IT export capacity has been
due to assembling processes that are not technology or skill
intensive, such as the processing of components in township and
village enterprises (Wall and Yin 1997: 181). Further, China lacks
the mix of entrepreneurship and technical knowledge that is
evident in industry clusters such as Silicon Valley, despite the
Chinese emigrant presence in the Valley and the “overseas
Chinese” networks of investment. While Chinese universities have
identified knowledge-based industries as the key to growth, very
few intellectuals in institutions and universities understand
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 11, July - December 2001
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business operations.
The minister responsible for China’s Information Industry
(MII), Wu Jichuan, has been quick to talk up the advances in
information and communication technologies. In a speech at the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Asia Forum in
December 2000, he emphasised the steps China was taking to
develop an information infrastructure and the benefits of
liberalisation for China’s trading partners. However, China’s
attempt to leapfrog over several generations of technological
development and move itself into the ranks of high technology
nations exploiting value-added services, faces a more immediate
problem: many of the best young minds reside overseas. This is a
crucial point. Even if we accept the capacity of Chinese people to
move mountains, as Mao’s favourite fable from the time of the
Great Leap Forward suggested, it is not just a case of “constructing”
an information infrastructure or a knowledge society. There is more
at stake. What is required, and what China’s leaders have desired
for decades, is to raise the country from backwardness to
prosperity. This means raising the quality (suzhi) of the population.
Central to the issue of quality improvement is the vision of a
global “knowledge economy” in which China can participate with
confidence and national pride. The knowledge economy is
currently at the core of national development strategies in China
and draws upon a vision of enhanced quality, technological
capacity and innovation. A number of major studies of the benefits
and challenges of the knowledge economy have been published
in China in recent years (Gan 1998; He 1999; Zhou 1999; Cui 1999;
Wu 1998; Jin 1999). One of the main contentions is that Chinese
society is well placed to take advantage of the knowledge economy,
being traditionally a networked society (that is, if one discounts
the attempts of the Communist government to organise organic
networks into politicised bureaucracies). The knowledge economy,
if allowed to develop, can therefore be “rewired” on to the
traditional network society of China.
The optimism inherent in this vision is tempered by the fact
that China has a large population of unskilled workers and a
relatively small pool of knowledge workers. As government
sponsored information technology initiatives in the U.K, Europe,
Singapore and Malaysia have demonstrated, the promotion of
knowledge-based applications and the development of the
economy have a number of points of intersection. At the core of
technological development is the role of the intellectual.

The Chinese “intellectual”, in contrast to the European concept
of people with superior intellectual ability and refined tastes, has
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 11, July - December 2001
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a much broader demographic sweep. Literally, the term
“intellectual” (zhishi fenzi), means a person who possesses
knowledge. According to the Chinese encyclopaedia, Ci hai (1989:
1953), zhishi fenzi, is defined as: “Mental workers with specific
cultural and scientific knowledge, such as science and technology
workers, art workers, teachers, doctors, editors, and journalists.”
This Marxist understanding asserts that intellectuals came into
being due to the appearance of surplus products and class division
in society. However, it further maintains that intellectuals are not
a separate class; rather they belong to different classes. And the
link is clearly made between intellectuals and their public duty.
During the Chinese revolution, intellectuals were often in the
vanguard and served as a bridge between the Chinese Communist
Party and the masses. According to the Marxist version of
historical materialism, when productive forces and the scientific
and cultural levels of the population have substantially increased
– sometime in the future, intellectuals will no longer exist as the
difference between physical work and mental work will be
eliminated.
Meanwhile, intellectuals are identified as having a role in
serving the people, a role that has been handed to them by their
“paymasters”, the Chinese state. This relationship of mutual
dependence is somewhat problematical, as is the association with
patriotism (aiguo zhuyi). The problematical part of the association
of intellectuals and patriotism is that there have been many
celebrated accounts of “heroic” dissidents who stood up against
the repressive state apparatus and championed the rights of free
expression. Those critical of the state machinery have subsequently
found cause to proclaim their political stance as stemming from a
patriotic spirit, a need “to save the country”. The Tiananmen
Square protests of May/June 1989 were a time when students and
intellectuals took a stand to demonstrate against corruption and
inflation. This was celebrated by the student leadership and many
observers as a patriotic act and a return of the May Fourth Spirit although it is still officially condemned by China’s leadership as
an unpatriotic disturbance.
The patriotic tradition goes back a long way, with many
intellectuals posthumously being accorded the status of warriors
who died in battle. Over 2000 years ago the poet Qu Yuan clasped
a big stone to his breast and leapt into the River Miluo in frustration
at being unable to do anything to save his state. The fifth day of
the fifth month of the lunar calendar is celebrated as the Day of
Dragon Boat Festival to commemorate his drowning. Intellectuals
who made sacrifices for their country, and for the Chinese “people”
(renmin), are thus honoured as heroic role models in the best
tradition of socialist hagiography. In the 20th century the
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 11, July - December 2001
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relationship between intellectuals and the nation was recorded in
glorious prose. The most cited examples of patriotic sentiment
were the May Fourth Movement (May 4, 1919) when students
protested the ceding of German territory in Shandong Province
to the Japanese following the signing of the Versailles Treaty.
The most salient point for our discussion of intellectuals and
patriotism, however, concerns the great numbers of students who
have studied overseas and returned home with knowledge to
contribute to nation-building - by participating in the May Fourth
ethos, the Communist Revolution, and more recently the reforms
of the past two decades. The idea of studying in the West has long
been a means to an end for many young Chinese. While many
have not returned from their studies over the years, the majority
have contributed to the nation’s stock of technical and more
recently business knowledge. Returning home to China did not
necessarily entail a better life. Many intellectuals suffered from
the policies of the Maoist era in which returning intellectuals were
ranked lower than workers, soldiers and peasants (gong-nongbing).
During the so-called revolutionary period when the Chinese
Communist Party gained ascendancy over the Nationalists (the
Guomindang), the long-standing relationship between the nation
and intellectuals was redefined as selfless devotion and loyalty
to the communist cause. As early as the 1940s Mao Zedong
demanded that the role of the writer was to be a “cog and screw
in the revolutionary machinery” (Wagner 1987: 192). During the
early 1960s intensive ideological education was directed at officers
and soldiers, as well as intellectuals and workers. They were
expected to “learn from Lei Feng”, the PLA hero lionised by
Chairman Mao. Lei Feng described himself as a “screw that never
rusts – sticking to the place where the Party assigned me to” (Lei
Feng: 2001). His view of the pursuit of personal interests was ‘as
autumn wind sweeping away fallen leaves’, a reference to the
ephemeral nature of individualism. People were subsequently
regarded as raw material. They were denied the right to express
feelings or personal aspirations. From this perspective it is
understandable that when educational exchange with the West
restarted in 1972 after the hiatus of the Cultural Revolution, those
students or scholars who did not return from abroad were accused
of “defecting” (panguo) (Zweig and Chen 1995:19). Likewise,
scholars who did return would claim that they did so because
they loved their nation, as the famous motto of returned scholars
in the 1980s goes, “science does not have national boundaries but
I (the scientist) have the nationality”.
The problem of a skilled workforce had begun to become
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 11, July - December 2001
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apparent about the same time that China implemented its four
modernizations policy following the demise of Chairman Mao’s
anointed successor, Hua Guofeng, in 1978. Beginning in 1979 the
Chinese government, acting under the architect of reform Deng
Xiaoping, realised that a shortage of highly skilled personnel was
hampering its ambition to catch up with Western science and
technology. It decided for the first time since 1949 to send large
numbers of students and scholars to the West to study (Zweig
and Chen 1995). However, sending the best and brightest scholars
abroad to gain the benefits of technology had the undesirable effect
of triggering a serious brain drain. The Ministry of Education
estimates that since the Reform in 1978, over 320,000 Chinese
scholars have studied overseas and just above 110,000 have
returned (Chen 2001:1). In 2000, of the total of 514,723 overseas
university students in the U.S.A, 54,466 (over 10.5%) were from
Mainland China, ranked the highest among all countries (He 2001:
3). Between 1990 and 1996, the number of doctorates in science
and engineering granted annually by U.S. universities to students
originally from China more than tripled (from 477 to 1,680). China
was ranked highest among all countries other than the US.
At the University of California at Berkeley, for example, the
proportion of students from Mainland China who were granted
graduate degrees in science and technology by the University of
California at Berkeley increased dramatically between 1980 and
1997. By the mid-1990s, over half of the degrees (53%) were granted
to students from China, compared to only 10% in the early 1980s
and 35% in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The number of graduate
degrees granted can be seen as a leading indicator of labour supply
in Silicon Valley, as most graduates find jobs in the region’s
technology companies (Saxenian 1999: 7).
In order to solve the problem of technology deficiency, China
initiated the “Torch Program” in the mid-1980s (see Wall and Yin
1997). The program was aimed at commercialising high-tech
research and development achievements and providing industrial
bases for high-tech industries and experimental sites for structural
reform of China’s innovation system (ATIP 95-88: Developing
Science Parks in Asia: 15). Under this program China has
established 52 New-High-Tech Development Zones (NHTZs) at
the national level and roughly the same number of NHTZs at the
local level. These 52 national hi-tech development zones are
scattered in 27 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities
directly under the Central Government. They are also known as
science and technology industrial parks, which enjoy preferential
treatment in relation to their operations. They are accorded special
import and export privileges to allow them to attract raw materials
and equipment; they are able to acquire loans from special
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 11, July - December 2001
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investment banks, and given preferential taxation benefits.
The science parks have attracted much foreign and domestic
investments, hosted tens of thousands of firms and created
thousands of millionaires. However, these achievements need to
be examined in context. A large proportion of the firms are
involved in real estate or trading businesses, rather than creative
research and development of new technology that is central in
other industry clusters such as Silicon Valley. The first and most
successful science park in China, Zhongguancun, located in
Beijing, for example, has claimed to be the Chinese Silicon Valley.
However, it differs dramatically from Silicon Valley in that it
functions much like a “mixture of modern electronic products
assembling and Chinese traditional country fair trade” (Yu 2001).
For this reason Zhongguancun is often considered as an “incubator
for millionaires”, but not an “incubator for high and new
technology”.
In recent years there has been a shift towards attracting
personnel to these new industries. This is the recognition that
technological advancement is not simply about information
technology but about knowledge. Moreover, it is about the idea
that knowledge is not simply about the diffusion or transfer of
codified technological knowledge, it is also about tacit knowledge,
that is the uncodified skills and techniques that are acquired
experientially by demonstration and through people working in
creative environments, best exemplified by knowledge-based
industrial clusters (David 1997: 22).

Incentive
Programs:
Promises Or
Problems?

170

The shift in emphasis from technological infrastructure
towards personnel is fundamental to concepts such as the
knowledge economy. The difference between an information
economy and knowledge economy might appear on the surface
to be semantic but the point is that knowledge entails a knower
whereas information appears as something independent or self
contained (Seeley-Brown & Duguid 2000: 120). A knowledge
economy or knowledge society therefore represents a shift towards
people, more particularly people with skills, and people who are
creators and carriers of knowledge. The term “knowledge
economy” is therefore central to development strategies. It is
increasingly used to describe the sector of national economies
engaged in the production and distribution of services and
commodities that draw upon people’s intellectual capital.
The role of human capital in knowledge production is vital
for China. There is a belief among many in China’s government
that China might have a competitive advantage in software
development and knowledge-based applications due to its
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 11, July - December 2001
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relatively advanced higher education system, where much
emphasis is placed on mathematics. This is also a counter to this
optimism, one that says that China has not been able to produce
innovative research. It is more of an adopter than an innovator.
Despite the great inventions celebrated in Chinese history, technical
innovations during the 20th century have flowed from the North
to the South. Much of this has to do with the critical mass of
research and investment in countries such as the US. This has been
aided by both the presence of technology clusters surrounding
US universities such as Stanford University and University of
California Berkeley, and the culture of innovation generated in
such incubators (Kenney and Von Burg 2000). Added to this is the
fact that these areas attract the skills of immigrant entrepreneurs
and PhD candidates, many of the latter category seeking to use
their intellectual capital to “purchase” a green card.
Reversing the brain drain began to be seen as an economic
and social solution following Deng Xiaoping’s famous “trip to the
south” (nan xun) in 1992, the catalyst for a more liberal climate in
China (Zweig and Chen 1995: 22). It also resulted in a more liberal
policy towards Chinese scholars overseas, which on paper, allowed
students and scholars to come and go freely (laiqu ziyou) (Zweig
and Chen 1995: 23). This has formed the basis of the current
government guiding principle (fangzhen) towards studying
overseas, being “supporting studying overseas, encouraging
returning, coming and going freely” (zhichi liuxue, guli huiguo, lai
qu ziyou).
Intellectuals, in making their decisions as to whether they
should stay in the Western countries they were studying in, or
return to China, began to take into consideration their personal
needs and interests. Patriotism is now no longer a sole
determinant. Zweig and Chen (1995) for example interviewed
273 Chinese students, scholars, and other former residents of China
residing in the US in 1993. They found that “higher social status
in China’ (26.0%) and ‘better career opportunities in China” (20.5%)
were the two most common considerations for returning home.
Patriotism (17.3%) occupied third place. By the late 1990s incentive
programs were shifted towards attracting highly skilled personnel
back. China realised that its developing industries were not
necessarily producing highly qualified personnel. It was felt that
if highly qualified personnel living abroad could be attracted to
return, they would bring back not only knowledge but also
investment and new industry expertise. In May 1998 the then
fourth wealthiest man in Asia, the Hong Kong media tycoon, Li
Ka-Shing, expressed an intention to Chen Zhili, the Minister of
Education to provide scholarships for students. Chen suggested
to Li Ka-Shing that these funds should be used to attract highly
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 11, July - December 2001
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qualified personnel from overseas (Li 2001). This became the now
famous Changjiang Scholars program (Changjiang xuezhe jiangli
jihua - also known as the Chueng Kong Scholars Program).
In 1998, the Ministry of Education began the Changjiang
Scholars Program, spending US$ 15 million annually on returnees
who will be employed by selected universities as specially
employed professors. It adopts a “Post Allowance” strategy by
which universities apply for posts that are qualified to employ
Specially Employed Professor (SEP). Those nominated posts and
SEPs are examined and reviewed by specialists of appropriate
fields (mostly academics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences).
These are then approved by the Examination Committee, which
consists of well-known domestic and overseas scholars. In the first
term Li Ka-Shing invested 60 million RMB (about US$7.25m;
US$1=RMB 8.27) and the Ministry of Education allocated an
equivalent amount in order to provide grants for the Specially
Employed Professors. Selected SEPs not only receive normal
salary, but also additional 100,000 RMB p.a. for three years. Most
significantly, these SEPs are given professional autonomy over
research projects: that is they are allowed to develop their own
projects and head up a team of researchers. Apart from receiving
a higher salary than ordinary professors, recipients are also
provided with a free three-bedroom apartment and a start-up
research allowance of 2 million yuan, equivalent to over US
$240,000 (Chang 2001; Normile 2000).
Li Ka-Shing also invested 10 million RMB and established a
“Changjiang Scholars Achievement Award”. This granted the first
prize recipient 1 million RMB and the second place recipient 0.5
million RMB. These are significant financial incentives. One of
the requirements of SEPs is that those selected must remain in
their posts for a minimum of two years. This condition
immediately created a problem. Although 100,000 RMB is a high
salary by Chinese standards, it is by no means an attractive lure to
high-skilled scholars working overseas. Few scholars of renown
would pass up a much higher salary in Western countries to apply
for an SEP post in China. The result is that despite the Changjiang
Scholars Programme being originally aimed at recruiting scholars
from overseas, most of those applying and being selected as SEPs
are scholars who had already returned some years ago. In order
to rectify this problem, when the Program entered its third term
in 2000 another category of Guest Professors was established. This
allows selected scholars to work in China for three to six months.
So far the Changjiang Scholars Program has operated for three
terms. Altogether 307 SEPs and guest professors have been
selected, of which only 95 are recruited directly from overseas
(Chang 2001).
172
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In addition to the Changjiang Scholars Program, China has
implemented a number of other incentive programs, including
the Spring Sunlight Programme (Chun hui jihua), the Programme
for Training Best Qualified Personnel for the New Millennium (Kua
shiji youxiu rencai peiyang jihua), the One Hundred People
Programme (Bai ren jihua), the Millions of Qualified Personnel
Project (Bai qian wan rencai gongcheng).
Money is not the only incentive. Chen Zhili, the Minister of
Education cited the experience of returnees in her New Year speech
to overseas-educated Chinese scholars. These returnees testified
that establishing and developing homeland careers gives a higher
sense of achievement (Chen 2001). It seems that incentive plus
patriotism is the package that the Chinese government is offering
to attract overseas-educated Chinese scholars back. If they cannot
return to China, they are asked to be patriotic and “serve China”
from distance by establishing networks and business interests.
They are also encouraged to stay in China temporarily to deliver
lectures. The Chinese government has put in place a campaign to
attract back Chinese scholars residing overseas permanently.
Initiated in 1997, this was called the Spring Sunlight Programme
(Chun hui jihua). The program clearly states that funds are to be
primarily granted to those Chinese scholars overseas who have
obtained doctoral qualifications and have made remarkable
academic achievements, including those who have obtained
foreign permanent residency. This is despite the Chinese
citizenship laws, which on paper do not allow recognition and
repatriation support of those who have obtained permanent
residency abroad (hua qiao). This program ostensibly provides
funds to bring back successful entrepreneurs from Silicon Valley
to conduct lecture tours. This occurred in 1998 when 15 Chinese
PhDs from the Valley returned and were feted as Chinese “success
stories”. Local provincial governments also contribute to such
schemes.
These incentive programs focus more on attracting traditional
scientists and scholars to work in universities and state-owned
research centres than supporting IT professionals and software
engineers to work in private companies. It should also be noted
that the intellectuals that are encouraged under these schemes are
mainly science and technology personnel. This excludes critical
intellectuals. As Song Defu, the head of Personnel Ministry of
China, has put it, in order to face the challenge of the global
knowledge economy, China needs a large population of high-level
personnel who master advanced technology, and who are familiar
with international political economy and international regulations,
and who understand the operations of the market economy (Wang
2000: 3). Most plans to attract scholars back are therefore oriented
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 11, July - December 2001

173

KEANE & LIN: Patriotism is not enough ...

towards high technology fields. One programme, the Programme
for Training Best Qualified Personnel for the New Millennium (Kua
shiji youxiu rencai peiyang jihua), does grant awards to scholars
working within social sciences, but one of the requirements of
training the selected applicants is that the foremost emphasis must
be placed upon improving their knowledge of philosophy, that is
Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping
Thought.

Conclusion:
Better Life
For All
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The idea of attracting highly skilled personnel back to China
is fundamental to a vision of a society fuelled by “new economy”
logic. However, the new economy/ knowledge economy
conjuncture incorporates more than just reversing the “brain
drain”: it means using intellectual capital to generate economic
capital. This entails a paradigm shift from knowledge as a “public
good” to a private good (see Myletka 2000: 41). The latter
conceptualisation provides the basis of R&D, and the development
of Intellectual Property Rights such as patents, copyrights and
trademarks. China’s attempt to catch up and even to “leapfrog”
into the information age includes building “national champions”
that can compete with globally dominant transnationals such as
Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard and Sun Microsystems, all of which
grew out of the Silicon Valley environment of incubators, startups and venture capital, and all of which reap profit through
innovation and highly-skilled workforces (see Nolan 2001).
Much has been learnt about the new global economy from
the West. Unfortunately, odds are stacked against China being a
major player, despite having the seventh largest world economy
in terms of GDP (Howkins 2001). According to Nolan (2001), while
China has nurtured strong “home brands” such as Legend
Computer and Huawei, it does not have the R& D capacity to
make its IT sector globally competitive post-WTO accession.
Furthermore, the problem with the returned scholar programs – a
key to enabling R&D - is that so far they have failed to attract the
category of intellectual most required for China’s new information
and communication technology sector. As mentioned above,
Chinese computer engineers and software developers stand to
make more money in the West than they would in China. If they
do return to China they often work for Western firms such as
Microsoft.
Enabling synergies between information technology,
creativity, and innovation – now widely understood as the essence
of the new economy (Howkins 2001; Leadbetter 1999, Brown and
Duguid 2000; Cairncross 1997)- is an important step in China’s
revitalising its education system and producing more IPAsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 11, July - December 2001
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generating knowledge-based service industries. However, while
creativity and innovation are taken as the blueprints for the future
by many senior technocrats, their implementation within the social
structure will inevitably take more time due to their widespread
lack of recognition within the education system. Meanwhile, there
are positive signs emerging in China’s cities. Central and local
governments are looking towards fast-tracking developments in
new creative industries that function as regional multimedia
incubators in modern cosmopolitan cities: for instance, in megacities such as New York, London, and Tokyo, as well as in medium
population density cities such as Helsinki, Toronto, Singapore,
Sheffield and Glasgow (see Porter 1998; Braczyk et al 1999). The
cosmopolitan leverage of “creative clusters” is becoming evident in
China today. This urban renewal is reflected in plans to make China’s
cities more dynamic, more creative, and ultimately more attractive
to foreign investment. The rationale is that by attracting technology
transfer and investment this will increase the performance capacity
and efficiency of Chinese industries.
In order to achieve a balance between infrastructure and
innovation, China - like Malaysia and Singapore — has begun to
realize the need for creative content and the need to provide Chinese
language software that resonates with consumer demand. A dozen
major Chinese cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Shenyang and
Chongqing have enacted a series of regulations and launched a
number
of
new
projects
to
promote
“cultural
commercialisation”(China Daily Nov. 27, 2000). Much of this
infrastructure is well developed in the major urban centres. In Beijing
plans are underway to build an international “media avenue” in
the Xuanwu District featuring industries involved in journalism,
publishing, film and television, and Internet as well as being a
location for conventions and exhibitions (http://
english.peopledaily.com.cn/200110/24/eng20011024_83041.html
(4.11.01).
Municipal governments in Tianjin and Shanghai have
developed key projects based around the concept of “information
ports” in which broadband inter-district networks facilitate the
development of application systems and cable TV networks
(Asiainfo Daily News, Jan 18, 2001). The Singapore companies
Creative Technology and Dragon Land have collaborated in a
US$100 million investment to create a Creative Dragon Park in
Qingdao (Shandong Province). The Chinese government and the
local Shandong government have offered special incentives to
companies from the US, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore to locate
in the park (Straits Times 21 Oct. 2000). Plans are also in train to set
up a university campus within the park. According to reports “The
intention is to create an environment in which knowledge-driven
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 11, July - December 2001
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companies with high value-added activities can thrive” http://
www.dragonland.com.sg/biztimes.htm (5.11.01).
One of the common features of successful new multimedia
precincts is that they foster an open and cosmopolitan lifestyle
that in turn encourages innovation by connecting participants with
intellectual knowledge and ideas generated outside of the local
environment. The competition between the national capital Beijing
(accorded the honour of staging the 2008 Olympics) and Shanghai
(positioning itself as the cultural centre of China), provides
evidence of the “death of distance” by which innovative and
ambitious cities compete to fulfil the local requirements of global
markets (Porter 2000; Cairncross 1997, Hall and Pfeiffer 2000).
Recently the Zhonguancun Science and Technology Park, located
near Beijing University and China’s leading IT university, Qinghua
University, was allowed to put in place 13 new regulations
pertaining to its management, following a suggestion by the vice
premier of the State Council that Park officials might like to
experiment with organization models that would promote
entrepreneurial activity and attract “talented people”.
The implications for social governance need to be noted.
China’s high-technology intellectuals now are accorded a place in
the vanguard of the new revolution. They receive preferential
treatment. The government assists them financially to develop new
projects with the hope that they will mentor a new generation of
IT professionals. If they can’t return to China, they are asked to be
patriotic and serve China from a distance by establishing networks
and business interests. They are a new super class of nerds. As
opposed to critical intellectuals such as writers and dissidents, the
techno-elite class are trusted as sons and daughters of China who
need a creative environment to think and to develop.
Integration into the global economy through WTO accession
is not just a means to restore national pride. It is a necessary step,
a final part of the economic reform package that the regime hopes
will deliver long-term social and economic benefits despite shortterm pain. It remains to be seen how liberalisations and new
organizational models that are put in place to accommodate
China’s transition into the global knowledge economy are
incorporated into the wider society. The bottom line is that a more
relaxed form of social governance is the pay-off for those deemed
to be the bearers of the technological dream. For the broad masses
of people with less to offer the country the special benefits are
likely to be withheld until communism is just a little closer to
realization.
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NOTES:
1. See Financial Times Information, Dec. 18, 2000.
2. For instance the value of copyright industries in the U.S. in 1997 was
America’s number one export, worth US$414 billion (Howkins 2001).
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